

Is the Army's Reserve Component Imbalanced, Separate & Unequal?

by

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UNEQUAL?**

by

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ABSTRACT

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In this SRP, there will be information presented to argue that the Army's Reserve Component (RC) is imbalanced, separate and unequal. The Army's RC is the largest Reserve Component within the Department of Defense (DOD). As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan draw down and as the defense budget forecasts a significant reduction in spending, the Army's RC will have to be a relevant, efficient, and effective force provider capable of full spectrum operations into the 21st century. The current composition requires review in order to determine if the US Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG) have the appropriate composition in order to be able to give the Army's Active Component and national leaders more flexibility and more capabilities. Two strategic options will present ways of enhancing the capabilities of the Army's RC. A comprehensive analysis of these two strategic options will evaluate and recommend the best strategic option.

IS THE ARMY'S RESERVE COMPONENT IMBALANCED, SEPARATE & UNEQUAL?

Background of the US Army's Reserve Component

The US Army has the largest Reserve Component (RC) within the Department of Defense (DOD). The Army encompasses 563,000 RC Soldiers and it provides 50% of the Army's forces and capabilities (See Figure 1)¹. The Army's RC is composed of two reserve forces. The US Army National Guard (ARNG) is the US Army's oldest and largest RC within the DOD. The US Army Reserve (USAR) is the US Army's second oldest and second largest RC in DOD. During federal emergencies, the President of the United States and the US Congress, under Title 10, can mobilize and deploy the USAR and ARNG, in order to provide the US Army additional operational and strategic capabilities.² During state emergencies, a governor, under Title 32, can mobilize the ARNG, in order to provide support for natural disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and homeland defense.³ During federal emergencies, the ARNG and USAR have divided their compositions in two ways, the ARNG is predominately a RC Maneuver Fires and Effects (MFE) provider to the US Army, and the USAR is predominately a RC Force provider of support enablers to the US Army. The current RC composition has limitation in certain capabilities and access. A detailed synopsis of the USAR and the ARNG will review their perspective histories, mission statements, compositions, and summarize their current posture as RC force providers.

The DOD personnel end-strength for FY 2012 and AC to RC Ratio:

Army's AC strength is 562K and the Army's RC 563K.	(AC to RC= 1:1)
Marine's AC strength is 202K and the Marine's RC strength is 40K	(AC to RC= 5:1)
Navy's AC strength is 326K and the Navy's RC strength is 66K	(AC to RC= 5:1)
Air Force's AC strength is 333K and the Air Force's RC strength is 178K	(AC to RC= 2:1)

Figure 1.

Background of the US Army National Guard

Throughout the US history, the ARNG has served as a state and federal military force. The ARNG has a dual mission of providing forces in support of their respective state and to the federal government. The ARNG has the responsibility to train and maintain National Guard units in each of the 50 states, plus Washington DC, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, and Guam. In each state, the governor commands their ARNG through the state appointed Adjutant General. The Adjutant General (TAG) is responsible for the readiness, welfare, and training of their perspective state's ARNG. The TAGs report and respond to their respective state governors and to the President of the United States. Additionally, the TAGs provide readiness information to the Director of the Army National Guard, who in turn reports to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB). In recognition of the importance of the NGB, the US Congress included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 that includes the Chief of the NGB as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴ The ARNG is the oldest component of the US armed forces, tracing its origin to the colonial militias formed in 1636. A review of the ARNG's history will explain how the ARNG evolved into today's RC force provider for the US Army and National Leaders.

History of the US Army National Guard

Throughout history of the United States, the US Army expanded during times of national crisis and it contracted during peacetime. As the US Army evolved as a land component force, so has the Army's RC. The American Citizen-Soldier originated from the British militia system of England known as 'train bands'⁵. The train bands consisted of male citizens between the ages of 16 to 60. The train bands provided additional armed forces for Great Britain's internal defense of the kingdom. All male citizens were

liable to military service as a part of their responsibilities as citizens.⁶ As the American colonies grew, the use of internal defense was necessary for protection. In 1620, the Pilgrims hired Captain Myles Standish, an English military officer, to organize the train bands within the colonies.⁷ In 1636, Massachusetts incorporated a number of train bands into the North Regiment. Frequently, the North Regiment repelled Indian attacks, and subsequently fought in the Pequot War from 1636 to 1637⁸. Two years after the Pequot War, the Artillery Company of Boston established the first uniformed volunteer militia unit. As the English colonies expanded in North America, the train bands expanded and became militias. By mid 18th century, each of the 13 colonies, through their provisional governors, enacted legislation for obligatory service in the militia. As part of their citizenship, all able-body white male citizens had to serve in the colonial militia. The British regular forces in the colonies worked with the militia, and had overarching authority because their national authority came from the British monarch.

As the colonial militia system continued to evolve, issues arose between colonial militias. When the colonial militias had to work together, issues arose in the command and control of neighboring militias. Issues between colonial militias became more apparent at the onset of the Revolutionary War. In letters to the President of the Continental Congress, General Washington expressed concerns that in-fighting between the colonial militias would be stumbling blocks to its military efficiencies in war.⁹ As a result, the continental congress published the Articles of Confederation in July 1778. The Articles of Confederation asserted that the central government, when necessary, could make requests for each state to provide their militia for mutual defense. Unfortunately, the Articles of Confederation had no forcing function, and as it

turned out, the militias' primary mission of defense remained at the state government level. For example, in 1781, when tasked for forces by the continental congress, Virginia's Governor, Thomas Jefferson, withheld the militia for the state's defense.¹⁰ Consequently, the creation of the US Constitution gave the federal government some authority over the militia.

In 1784, the US Constitution authorized the power to "raise and support armies...for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States..."¹¹ At that time, President Washington pressed for a larger standing Army and better training for the militia. In a compromise, the US Congress enacted the Militia Act of 1792.¹² The Militia Act authorized the 'organized militia', but it left it up to the states to train and maintain their militia. As a result, in the War of 1812, the militias had varying successes on the battlefield. The US Army leadership had major issues and concerns about the militias varying degrees of readiness and training.

To address some of the difficulties associated with the use of the militia in the War of 1812, Secretary of War, John Calhoun, developed the "expansible Army concept".¹³ Essentially, in times of crisis, the US Army would expand through conscripts and augmentations by the militia. Under the expansible Army concept, the militia provided the majority of troops during the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish American War.

Following the Spanish American War, the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, made two distinct observations, he found weakness in the expansible Army concept, and he determined that the states' militias were poorly trained. As a result, he formulated and

proposed the Dick Act of 1903.¹⁴ The Dick Act was a renaissance change to the armed forces as it created a more professionally trained and ready force for the US Army and the states' militia. The Dick Act formulated the organized militia in order to insure that the state's military forces were uniformly trained and a ready force accessible to the federal government during national emergencies. The Dick Act affirmed that the organized militia, re-named the Army National Guard (ARNG), would be the primary organized reserve force for the US Army.¹⁵ In addition, the Dick Act provided federal funding for the ARNG to have formal military training, military equipment, pay for soldiers, and military weapons. The ARNG units were required to drill at a minimum of 24 times each year and to attend at least a 5 consecutive days of training. By imposing these measures on the ARNG, the federal government gave more authority to the President of the United States for using the ARNG. However, the Dick Act limited the use of the ARNG to executing the laws of the union, suppressing insurrection, and repelling invasion. Furthermore, the ARNG could not deploy overseas without the approval of the governor, and if approved, the overseas deployment was limited to nine months.¹⁶

Throughout the 20th and 21st century, various pieces of congressional legislation transformed the ARNG into the organization that it is today. The National Defense Act (NDA) of 1916 abandoned the expansible Army concept, and established the citizen-soldier of the ARNG and USAR as an intricate part of the United States defense forces. In case of war or national emergency, the President has the authority to mobilize the ARNG for the duration of national and federal emergencies. Additionally, the yearly drill dates increased from 24 days to 48 days and from 5 consecutive training days to 15

consecutive training days. In 1920, an amendment to the NDA authorized the position of the Chief of the Military Bureau (later called the National Guard Bureau). In 1933, the National Guard Mobilization Act made the National Guard a component of the Army. The NDA of 1987 stated that a governor could not withhold consent with regard to active duty outside the United States.¹⁷ Today, the President of the United States has the ability to call up the National Guard for active duty federal military service during a congressionally sanctioned national emergency or war.¹⁸

The ARNG's History of Combat Deployments

In the 20th and 21st century, the ARNG has been a key RC force provider for the US Army during combat operations. During World War I, the ARNG made up 40 percent of the combat divisions in France. In World War II, the ARNG made up over 19 divisions in combat. During the Korean conflict, over 140,000 ARNG Soldiers deployed in support of the war effort. While President Johnson decided not to fully mobilize the RC for Vietnam, the Kentucky ARNG sent a Field Artillery Battalion, and the Indiana ARNG sent a Special Forces unit to Vietnam. In 1990, over 63,000 ARNG soldiers deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm. Since 9/11, over 300,000 ARNG soldiers have deployed in support of Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).¹⁹ The ARNG plays a vital role during federal emergencies and during national crisis.

The ARNG's History of Stateside Mobilizations

During the 20th and 21st century, the National Guard (NG) has been a critical force provider in support of domestic crisis, natural disasters, and as a part of Homeland Defense. Historical highlights include civil support, riot control, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. For instance, in 1957, the Governor of Arkansas

mobilized the ARNG to deny black students entry into the integrated school system. Shortly thereafter, President Eisenhower federalized the entire Arkansas NG in order to ensure the safe entry of black students. In May 1970, the Governor of Ohio mobilized the Ohio NG to Kent State University in order to quell anti-Vietnam protests. In September of 1992, the Governors from Florida, Louisiana, Hawaii and Guam mobilized their ARNG units for natural disaster relief and humanitarian assistance after the destruction of Hurricanes Andrew, Iniki, and Typhoon Omar.²⁰ In 2005, Governors throughout the United States mobilized multiple ARNG units in response to providing security and humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.²¹ The ARNG plays a vital role during federal emergencies and during national crisis.

Current ARNG Composition

Currently, the ARNG has 358,000 Soldiers spread across the United States and its territories. The ARNG has approximately 89% of their personnel in the operating force with the remaining personnel in the generating force. The composition of the operating force consists of 57% in the Maneuver, Fires, & Effects (MFE), 27% in the Operational Support (OS), and 15% in Force Sustainment (FS).²² (See Figure 2).²³

Current ARNG's Mission Statement

In accordance with the 2012 ARNG Strategic planning guidance, the ARNG mission is as follows, "The Army National Guard: a community –based, dual mission, operational force providing the Army with ready units in a revolving, predictable cycle that respond in support of combatant commanders on a global level and domestic missions on behalf of the governors".²⁴

Current composition of the Army National Guard

Headquarters commands:

1 Headquarters of the Directorate of Army National Guard
54 State Adjutants General Headquarters
8 Infantry divisions
6 Theater Command/Brigades (TSC, 2 x ESC, Aviation, MP, Air & Missile Defense)

A total of 113 Brigades (Multi-functional Brigades and Functional Brigades)

28 x Brigade Combat Teams (26 Infantry BCTs and 2 Armor BCTs)
17 x Aviation Brigades
28 x Sustainment Brigades
4 x MP Brigades
8 x Engineer Brigades
8 x Field Artillery Brigades
6 x Battlefield Surveillance Brigades
2 x Air Defense Brigades
2 x Special Forces Groups
2 x Signal Brigades
5 x Troop Commands
1 x Chemical Brigade
1 x Homeland Response Force
1 x Information Operations Group
1 x Military Intelligence Brigade

Figure 2.

Summary of the ARNG

From 1620, the ARNG evolved from train bands to organized militias to the ARNG. The ARNG supports the states and supports the nation during times of crisis. Today's ARNG is the largest RC force within the DOD, and the United States Constitution has mandated its existence. Throughout US history, the ARNG was the Army's RC primary MFE force provider. While the ARNG has flourished, the ARNG should balance their force ratio by adding enabler units in order to provide additional support during disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

For instance, in 1992, post Hurricane Andrew, 5,700 ARNG Soldiers from Florida and Louisiana mobilized for humanitarian assistance and security. Due to the overwhelming need for additional assistance, over 22,000 active Army Soldiers and 800 USAR Soldiers mobilized to Florida and Louisiana in order to provide additional medical and logistical support for humanitarian assistance.²⁵ In late August 2005, the Governor

of Louisiana mobilized the Louisiana National Guard (NG) to support relief efforts after Hurricane Katrina had devastated New Orleans. The Louisiana NG was constrained to support the disaster relief due to the flooding of their NG facilities, and due to the fact that 40% of their NG forces were deployed overseas. In a unity of effort, DOD and NGB mobilized and deployed 50,000 NG Soldiers and over 14,000 Active Army Soldiers to Louisiana and Mississippi for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.²⁶ The AAR by Homeland Security determined that DOD and Homeland Security had significant shortages in medical support, logistical command and control, and communications platforms.²⁷ The ARNG should consider adding support enablers in order to be more effective, efficient, and have increased capabilities.

Background on the US Army Reserve

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) is a federal RC force provider to the US Army that provides trained and ready soldiers and units with critical Maneuver Support, Operational Support, Force Sustainment, and Health Services capabilities. The USAR is centrally commanded by a reserve Lieutenant General, who serves as the Chief of Army Reserve (CAR) and as the Commanding General of the US Army Reserve Command (USARC). The CAR reports to the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) on all matters concerning the USAR, and as the Commanding General for the USARC, he reports to US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) on the USAR's training and readiness. Throughout the United States and abroad, the USAR has a long and distinguished history and lineage.

History of the US Army Reserve

The US Congress enacted the official creation of the USAR in 1908, but the genesis of the USAR was in 1756. Some historians claim that Captain Robert Rogers

and the Rogers' Rangers, had received a royal commission, and thus his unit was the first corps of nationally oriented American Citizen-Soldiers.²⁸ Throughout the wars and conflicts of 18th and 19th century, the federal government has a small standing Army and they had limited access to the states' militias. Based on the limited access to the states' militia by the President and US Congress, the federal government moved to create a federal reserve volunteer force. There were several failed attempts to have a well-organized national militia by national leaders like General Washington i.e. 'Washington-Knox proposal',²⁹ the act of 3 March 1847,³⁰ and the Upton proposal of 1878.³¹ There was a lot of tension and resistance by politicians and by the division of militia affairs for creating a national militia as a federal reserve force. Congressman James Hay, a powerful opponent and Chairman of the House of Militia Affairs Committee, stated, "As long as there is a national guard, there was no need for a reserve".³² Through many negotiations, Congress passed the Senate Bill 1424 on 23 April 1908 that authorized the Army to establish a medical reserve corps of medical officers. The creation of the 'Regular Army Reserve' in 1908 was the first step to creating a national militia under the control of the federal government.

Throughout history, the Regular Army Reserve supported the US Army as specialty providers, personnel fillers, and force providers. In 1916, the NDA established the Officer Reserve Corps (ORC), the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC), and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). Eventually, the medical reserve corps merged into the ORC. The NDA provided, "the Army of the US shall consist of the Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the ORC, the ERC, the ARNG....while in the service of the US, and such other land forces are now or may hereafter authorized by law".³³ The ERC was a

specialty force provider that was composed of Engineer, Signal, Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Medical. The ORC and the ROTC were used as personnel providers for the Regular Army. After World War I (WW I), the Regular Army Reserve was re-named the 'Organized Reserve'. As the US Army expanded for WW I, WW II, and the Korean War, so did the Organized Reserve. The Organized Reserve participated in WW I by sending 170,000 ORC and ERC soldiers to serve in the American Expeditionary Force. The Organized Reserve sent over 200,000 ORC and ERC soldiers to WW II, and over 240,000 ORC and ERC soldiers were involved in the Korean War. It was during the Korean War that the Organized Reserve merged the ORC and ERC, and became the United States Army Reserve (USAR). During the advent of the Vietnam War, President Johnson refused to call up the RC.³⁴ While USAR was not fully mobilized for the Vietnam War, the USAR sent 35 units and over 5900 soldiers to the Vietnam War. The end of the Vietnam War brought about foreign and domestic changes. At the end of the Vietnam conflict, the DOD initiated a restructure of the total force called the Abram's doctrine.³⁵ The effects of an all-volunteer force and a total force policy shifted responsibilities and resources to the Army's RC.

In 1983, the USAR civil affairs deployed to Grenada in support of Operation Urgent Fury. In 1989, USAR military police units and civil affairs units deployed during Operation Just Cause. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, more than 84,000 USAR soldiers deployed to the Middle East. Post Desert Storm, in the 1993 offsite agreement, the USAR de-activated all RC MFE units and became RC support enablers.³⁶ The USAR deployed soldiers for contingency operations and peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Sinai, and Kosovo. In 1992, 800 USAR Soldiers

provided humanitarian assistance and disaster relief after Hurricane Andrew hit Florida and Louisiana. Since 9/11, the USAR deployed over 200,000 USAR soldiers in support of OIF and OEF.³⁷

Current Composition of the US Army Reserve

Currently, the USAR consists of 205,000 soldiers and it is the second largest DOD Reserve Component. Approximately 70% are in the operating force and approximately 30% are in the institutional and force generating force. (see figure 3).³⁸

Current Composition of the United States Army Reserve

2 Headquarters commands:

Office of the Chief Army Reserve (OCAR)
United States Army Reserve Command (USARC)

21 Theater Enabling Commands, 12 Support Commands, 72 Functional & Multi-Functional brigades:

2 x Medical Command (10 x Medical Brigades)
1 x Military Intelligence Readiness Command (40 Strategic and Tactical units)
1 x Civil Support Command (4 x separate brigades)
1xTheater Aviation Command (1 x Aviation Brigade and 6 x Aviation Bn: to include 1 Attack Helicopter Bn)
1 x Military Police Command (4 x MP brigades and 2 x CID BN)
1 x Theater Signal Command (4 x Theater Signal Brigades)
1 x Theater Sustainment Command, (2 x Support Command, 8 x ESC, 20 x SB, 9 x RSG)
2 x Theater Engineer Command (4 x Engineer Brigades and 2 x MEB)
1x Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, (5 x CA Brigades & 2 POG)
1 x USAR Joint & Special Troops Support Command
3 x Theater IO Groups
1 x USAR Defense Information System Agency
1 x USAR Legal Command
1 x Chemical Brigade

6 x Support Command:

4 x Regional Support Commands, 2 x Mission Support Command, and 1 x AR Career Division

4 x Institutional Training Command:

Training Command (Battle Command Training Division) (5 x training brigades), Training Command (TASS), and two Training Commands.

9 x Institutional Training Divisions:

Training Division (Operational Support), 2 x Training Division, 3 x Training Division (Operations), Training Division (Individual Training), Division (Initial Entry Training), and Training Division (Leader Training)

1 x Training Support Command:

US Army Reserve Support Command (1st Army) and 2 x Training Support Divisions, (1st Army is an AC/RC Command)

Figure 3.

Current USAR's Mission Statement

The USAR provides trained, equipped, and ready Soldiers and cohesive units to meet global requirements across the full spectrum of operations. The vision statement states the following, “as an enduring operational force, the Army Reserve is the premier force provider of America’s Citizen-Soldier for planned and emerging missions at home and abroad. Enhanced by civilian skills that serve as force multiplier, we deliver vital military capabilities to the Total Force”.³⁹

Summary of the US Army Reserve

From 1908, the USAR started as the Regular Army Reserve, the ORC, the ERC, the Organized Reserved, and merged into the USAR. The USAR evolved to give the President and Congress more flexibility and capability in providing a reserve forces to the US Army, in part, due to the limited use and access to the ARNG. Throughout the history of the USAR, the USAR has always been a specialty provider, a personnel provider, and a force provider of MFE, OS, FS, HS, and a major trainer of the Army’s RC. In the 1990s, the USAR relinquished its role as a MFE provider and focused on being a RC support enabler to the US Army.

From an operational perspective, the USAR is a significant theater level sustainment provider for the US Army. In recent times, the ‘private contracted force’ has taken on a portion of the Army’s sustainment responsibilities. For example, the number of DOD contracted employees rose from 9,000 during Desert Storm to over 200,000 DOD contracted employees at the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005.⁴⁰ As of March 31, 2011 there were 174,000 DOD contracted personnel serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴¹

The increased usage of private contractors has diminished some of the sustainment responsibilities of the USAR. By relinquishing USAR MFE units and losing some sustainment responsibilities to private contracting, the USAR has limited their capabilities as RC enabler force to the US Army. Additionally, the USAR is restricted in their capability to conduct war-fighting functions and full spectrum operations.

Subsequently, the USAR is limited in conducting the Army's two core competencies of conducting Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS).⁴² Adding MFE units to the USAR significantly enhances their capabilities as a RC force provider to the US Army. The USAR should consider adding MFE units in order to be more efficient, effective, and have increased capabilities.

Summary of the Army's Reserve Component

From a total force perspective, the RC is a significant operational force provider for the US Army. The RC has 27 of the 41 Theater Commands, 8 of 18 Divisions, 28 of 73 BCTs, and 166 of 250 functional and multi-functional brigades. As stated previously, Army's RC is the largest RC within the DOD, but the Army's RC is the only DOD RC that separates their RC force composition by Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS). It is because the USAR and ARNG are divided by BOS, that the composition of Army's RC is imbalanced, separate & unequal.

The RC enables the US Army to accomplish its mission at home and abroad. From a strategic view point, as the US Army draws down from overseas contingency operations, and as the defense budget forecasts a major reduction in spending and in personnel, the Army's RC may have to justify keeping the largest RC in DOD. At the heart of this analysis is the question, 'what is the right mix of force capabilities within the Army's RC that will make the ARNG and USAR more efficient and effective force

providers for the Active Army and for the national leaders?’ In reviewing the composition of the RC's operational units, there are opportunities for enhancing the RC's capabilities. For instance, the common operational unit denominator between the ARNG and the USAR are Signal, Aviation, Sustainment, Engineer, Chemical, Military Police, and Military Intelligence. The non-common operating unit denominator between ARNG and USAR are Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense, Special Forces, Medical (echelons above medical battalions), Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations. Therefore, it is the non-common operating units that can increase the capabilities of the USAR and ARNG.

In other words, the ARNG could enhance their capabilities by having more support enabler units for homeland security, humanitarian assistance, and for natural disaster relief. The USAR could enhance their capability by having MFE units in order to have full capacity for conducting war-fighting functions, full spectrum operations, CAM and WAS. For the purpose of making the ARNG and USAR more efficient and effective force providers, a review of two strategic options will provide an array of options for revising the US Army's Reserve Component.

Introduction to Strategic Options

After reviewing the composition of the ARNG and USAR, this paper presents two strategic options for consideration to integrate the non-common operational units into the USAR and ARNG. The first strategic option is a merger of the USAR into the ARNG. The second strategic option is re-distribution and re-balancing of the USAR and ARNG. Both strategic options offer different outcomes to integrating the non-common operational units. Comprehensive analyses of these two strategic options include a review of previous merger discussions, address feasibility, suitability, acceptability, and

discuss associated risks. Finally, a comparison and contrast of the two options will reveal the best strategic option.

Strategic Option 1: Merger of the Reserve Component

Ideally, a merger of the USAR into the ARNG is a very efficient and effective method of increasing the RC's capabilities while reducing redundancies and saving millions of dollars. From the operational perspective, the ARNG gains 21 theater enabling commands, 12 support commands, and 72 functional & multi-functional brigades (see figure 3). Included in those operational units are the non-common units that are germane to the USAR. For instance, a merger provides the ARNG with 2 medical commands, 10 medical brigades, 1 civil affairs command, 5 civil affairs brigades, and 2 psychological groups. From the institutional and force generating units, the ARNG gains 14 institutional and training commands, and 6 support commands. A merger of this magnitude significantly enhances the ARNG's capabilities.

As previously mentioned, the AAR on Hurricane Katrina by Homeland Security determined that there were significant shortages in medical support, logistical support, and communications platforms. Conceptually, a merger of the USAR into the ARNG adds those shortages to the ARNG. The USAR support enablers, especially the medical and logistical assets, diminish the shortages mentioned in the AAR and increases the ARNG's capabilities.

From the aspect of feasibility, strategic option #1 empowers the state governors, the TAGs, and the Director of the ARNG with significant amounts of other support enablers that will enhance the ARNG's dual mission of providing forces in support of their state and the federal government. A merger adds more capabilities in maneuver support, sustainment assets, operational support assets, health services assets, and in

training assets. Those support enablers can significantly enhance the ARNG's capabilities to support states during national crisis and during federal emergencies. Therefore, based on the information presented, it is feasible to merge the USAR into the ARNG.

From the aspect of acceptability, a merger allows for the elimination of redundancies. For instance, because the ARNG has TAGs in every state, a director of ARNG, and the NGB as headquarters, there is a possibility to eliminate two command headquarters, i.e. OCAR and USARC, and six support command headquarters. In essence, eliminating eight headquarters elements could be a significant cost savings. On its face, the merger seems to be cost effective, reduces redundancies, and significant enhances the ARNG's capabilities.

As previously stated, a merger of the USAR into the ARNG could generate a substantial cost saving to the DOD. For instance, in 1965, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, proposed that merging the USAR into the ARNG would save \$150 million annually. Additionally, in 1997, a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report suggested that merging the USAR into the ARNG would save over \$500 million annually.⁴³ Both examples demonstrate that a merger would be a significant cost savings to the DOD. However, when Secretary of Defense McNamara tried to propose a merger of the USAR into the ARNG in 1965, the plan failed to gain support from the US Congress. Likewise, in 1995, the CBO presented the same merger proposal, and again, it failed to gain congressional support. Additionally, a recent example from the Air Force demonstrates that a merger is not acceptable. The Air Force nixed a merger of the Air Force Reserve into the Air National Guard because it was too big of an undertaking,

and less apparent benefit.⁴⁴ Given the previous failed attempts to merge the USAR into the ARNG, a merger is doubtful; therefore, strategic option 2 is not acceptable.

From the aspect of suitability, the approval process requires leadership support from DOD and approval from the US Congress. For instance, in order to merge the USAR into the ARNG, it requires agreement by the CAR and the Director of the ARNG, and then they must provide strong justification to gain concurrence by the Chief of Staff of the Army, Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense. Once DOD leadership agrees to the merger, then the merger requires the US Congress to vote on a new NDA. The fact that the merger could save millions of dollars is strong justification, but previous leaders and organizations have not been successful in implementing a RC merger. If the purpose of the merger is to integrate non-common operational units into the USAR and ARNG, then it is not suitable because it requires high-levels of concurrence and approval.

From the aspect of associated risk, strategic option #1 is high risk based on three factors. The first factor is that a merger requires an external approval process. A merger requires the support and approval from the US Army leadership, the DOD leadership, and the US Congress. Based on historical attempts of a merger, the approval process would likely be arduous, time consuming, and dependent on the US Congress and the President. The second factor is that a merger is a significant change in RC culture and history. Based on the review of the historical information and the evolution of the USAR and ARNG, it is the opinion of the author that the RC's culture, heritage, and traditions are perceived to be sacred. Therefore, to merge the USAR into the ARNG would be a significant impact to the RC. The third factor is that a merger is a loss of flexibility to the

national leadership. In other words, the USAR evolved, in part, to give the President and Congress more options in providing reserve forces to the US Army. Therefore, a merger is a loss in flexibility to the federal leadership. In summary, strategic option #1 is feasible because it adds more capabilities to the ARNG, but it is not acceptable because the cost savings do not warrant approval from DOD leadership or US Congress.

Additionally, strategic option #1 is not suitable because it requires an external approval process, there is a loss of flexibility to federal leadership, and it has high risks that require significant mitigation.

Strategic Option 2: Re-distribution and Re-balancing the RC Forces

Ideally, the re-balancing and re-distributing of RC forces significantly increases RC capabilities, integrates RC forces, and reduces force structure by 10%. Strategic option #2 provides enhanced operational capabilities to the USAR and ARNG by integrating the non-common operational units. Ideally, the USAR will have the full compliments of the BOS, and the ARNG will have the more appropriate support enablers that are conducive for disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and homeland defense. Strategic option #2 is a two-part consideration. The first consideration is an RC internal re-balancing and re-distribution of forces. Second consideration is an external re-balancing and re-distribution of forces between ARNG and USAR.

From an internal perspective, the re-distribution and re-balance of the USAR starts with the conversion of the training, institutional, and force generating units into operational units. Currently, the USAR has 30% (60,000 soldiers) in the institutional and force generating units. Strategic option #2 substitutes 11% (6,400 USAR soldiers) of the USAR's force generating units to operational maneuver forces. Strategic option #2 enhances USAR capabilities, without degrading the institutional and force generating

mission. In some instances, the training support units could have a dual role of being RC MFE units and continue providing training support. For example, First U.S. Army is an AC/RC multi-component command led by an active duty Lieutenant General. First U.S. Army is responsible for training, mobilizing, and deploying all Army RC units for worldwide contingency operations. It has over 6,400 USAR soldiers and over 3,000 AC soldiers as Trainer/Mentors for RC mobilization support.⁴⁵ In an internal USAR re-distribution and re-balance, strategic option #2 merges First U.S. Army HQ into USARC HQ to make one command and control headquarters that is responsible for the RC mobilization training and USAR readiness. Additionally, the USAR units convert from USAR training support units to USAR MFE units. The merger of First U.S. Army and USARC eliminates a major command headquarters. Conceptually, the new USARC or 'First Army Reserve Command' becomes the Command and Control (C2) headquarters for all USAR units and it becomes the mobilization trainer for the Army's RC.

From feasibility aspect, merging the First Army headquarters into the USARC headquarters, and converting training units into MFE units reduces the size of the USAR force generating units by 11%. The internal re-distribution and re-balancing of the USAR increases its capabilities by adding MFE, and increases effectiveness in full spectrum operations and BOS. Additionally, the MFE units can be tasked with a dual role of conducting MFE and providing training support. In essence, the USAR gains MFE units and continues to conduct their training mission. As far as the approval process for changing RC units, the USARC CG has the authority to convert USAR training units to MFE units; therefore, the approval process is simple and feasible.

From an acceptability aspect, the merger of two major command headquarters requires concurrence from the US Army leadership. Since USARC and First U.S. Army report to Forces Command (FORSCOM) on RC readiness, the justification for merging the two headquarters involves the presentation of the cost savings in efficiency and elimination in redundancy. Strategic option #2 is an acceptable option because it is a cost savings, eliminates redundancy, and increases operational RC capabilities.

From the suitability aspect, USARC is already aligned with First Army's USAR training units, so the merger would be transparent. Additionally, due to the pending DOD reductions to the active component force, the transfer from First Army to USARC would be complimentary. From the aspect of risk, the biggest risk factor to strategic option #2 is gaining acceptance by the US Army leadership to merge First Army HQ and USARC HQ, because strategic option 2 merges an AC/RC headquarters into an RC headquarters. The risks of merging the headquarters are mitigated by presenting the cost savings in efficiency by merging two major headquarters into one C2 headquarters. An internal re-distribution and re-balance of the USAR is feasible, acceptable, and suitable because it is cost effective, reduces the size of the USAR institutional and force generating units, and increase the USAR's MFE capabilities. Additionally, strategic option #2 is low risk because the re-distribution and re-balancing are conducted internally between USAR and US Army.

Ideally, the RC leadership could agree to conduct an external re-distribution and re-balance between the ARNG and USAR exchange units by using the 'round-out' concept. The utilization of the round-out concept began in the Abrams doctrine in order to align RC units with AC units for mobilization and deployment.⁴⁶ In the context of

strategic option #2, USAR and ARNG exchange non-common operating units, while maintaining the integrity and identity of the USAR and ARNG. Conceptually, an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT) could have two ARNG Infantry battalions and one USAR Infantry battalion as round-out units. A USAR medical command could have eight USAR medical brigades and two ARNG medical brigades as round-out units. The round-out concept exchanges of non-common operational units, thus enhancing the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and capabilities of the ARNG and USAR. The ARNG gains additional support enablers, and the USAR gains additional maneuver assets. Holistically, the round-out concept integrates and strengthens the RC relationship by adding capabilities to the USAR and ARNG. For instance, the NDA 2012 authorizes federal reserve units to provide support to the National Guard during natural disasters and humanitarian assistance.⁴⁷ Therefore, strategic option #2 builds upon the ARNG and USAR relationship to provide mutual support during national crisis as authorized by NDA 2012.

From a feasibility aspect, strategic option #2 is feasible because a re-distribution and re-balancing of RC forces allows the USAR and ARNG to have the full compliments of the Battlefield Operating Systems and support enablers. Additionally, in strategic option #2, the USAR and ARNG keep their identity and integrity as separate RC entities. From an acceptability aspect, strategic option #2 is acceptable to re-distribute RC forces that place appropriate amounts of MFE units within the USAR and appropriate amounts of support enablers within the ARNG. From a suitability aspect, the biggest dilemma that affects suitability is determining the force composition mix for the ARNG and USAR. The RC leaders must efficiently determine their requirements to

increase their capabilities and effectiveness. From the aspect of associated risks to strategic option #2, the risk factors are less than strategic option #1 because the approval process is internal. In other words, similar to the 1993 offsite agreement, AC and RC leaders can negotiate unit exchanges without DOD or congressional approval.⁴⁸ In summary, strategic option #2 offers two types of considerations that are independent of each other: one is the internal re-balance and re-distribution, and the second is the external re-balance and re-distribution. Therefore, strategic option #2 is feasible, acceptable, suitable, and has a low risk.

Conclusion

In comparing the strategic options, option #1 and option #2 are cost effective. Option #1 demonstrates cost savings by presenting two merger proposals in 1965 and 1995. In contrast, option #2 demonstrates cost savings through efficiency in merging two major command headquarters into one headquarters. In comparison, both options demonstrate increases in capabilities of the RC. Option #1 merges the USAR into the ARNG, and significantly strengthens the ARNG while eliminating the USAR. In contrast, option #2 internally and externally re-distributes and re-balances RC units within the USAR and ARNG. In comparison, both options reduce the size of the RC and enhance the overall mission as RC force providers for the US Army and National Leaders. Option #1 puts all RC forces in the ARNG and eliminates redundancy of eight headquarters. In contrast, option #2 re-distributes and re-balances the USAR and ARNG so that USAR and ARNG have enhanced capabilities. Simultaneously, it reduces USAR training units by 11%. In comparison, both options require an approval process to change the RC composition. Option #1 requires support and approval from DOD leadership and the US

Congress. In contrast, strategic option #2 requires internal approval from the US Army leadership.

After reviewing all information, strategic option # 2 is the best strategic option for increasing the RC's capabilities within the USAR and ARNG. On its face, strategic option #1 is cost effective, but the fact that option #1 requires approval from the US Congress makes it a high risk. Under strategic option #2, risks of approval or disapproval stays within the Army leadership. Strategic option # 2 offers the ARNG and USAR more BOS. Option # 2 creates an integrated RC force capable for conducting full spectrum operations, war-fighting functions, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Finally, as the defense budget forecasts a significant reduction in spending, strategic option #2 is cost effective and adds more flexibility to the RC. Equally important, the Army's RC becomes a stronger and more efficient force provider for the US Army and for the US National Leaders.

Endnotes

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